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The Coevolution of Segregation, Polarised Beliefs and
Discrimination: The Case of Private vs. State Education
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, LSE1
Abstract: In this paper we analyze the coevolution of segregation into private and state
schools, beliefs about the educational merits of di¤erent schools, and labour market dis-
crimination. In a dynamic model, we characterize a necessary and su¢ cient condition on
initial levels of segregation and beliefs under which full polarisation of beliefs and long run
labour market discrimination are sustainable. The model suggests a new perspective on
the long term e¤ects of di¤erent policy interventions, such as integration, school vouchers
and policies that are directly targeted towards inuencing beliefs.
1 Introduction
In a 2013 YouGov survey, when asked: Do state secondary schools give talented children
a good education and allow them to achieve their full potential?, 58% of state school
parents in the UK replied yes compared to only 48% of private school parents. Such beliefs
also exhibit big di¤erences across di¤erent political a¢ liations, socioeconomic status, and
geographical locations. As in the UK, a US 2014 Gallop poll shows a 10% di¤erence
in the share of state school parents and private school parents who believe that state
schools provide su¢ ciently good education.2 A strong relation between polarised beliefs
and individualsbackground comes up in surveys on other issues. Golub and Jackson
(2012), who study the e¤ect of segregation on belief polarisation, cite polling data that
shows that In October 2004, 47% of Republican poll respondents believed that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction just before the 2003 invasion of that country, as opposed to
only 9% of Democrats...This kind of disagreement occurs on many other important factual
questions for instance, whether temperatures on Earth are increasing over time.
The fact that segregation across networks -be it of schools, neighborhoods, political
associations, friendships etc.- may a¤ect and polarise beliefs, has received recent attention
in the literature. Dustmann and Preston (2001) analyze how segregation in neighborhoods
1We thank seminar participants in the CEPR Public Economics Conference 2015, LSE, Hamburg,
Glasgow Political Economy conference 2014, and Manheim Political Economy workshop 2015. ERC
grant SEC-C413 provided valuable nancial support for this research.
2See http://pdkintl.org/programs-resources/poll/ for the Annual PDK/Gallup Poll of the Publics
Attitudes Toward the Public Schools.
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a¤ects attitudes towards minorities. Algann et al (2015) show that studentspolitical
opinions converge among friends, and Boisjoly et al (2006) and La Ferrara et al (2014)
show that living in mixed-race housing lowers studentsprejudiced beliefs. Kaufmann and
Harris (2015) study the rise in segregation along racial lines in the UK and nd signicant
e¤ects of segregation on attitudes about the benets of immigration.3
In explaining the relation between segregation and beliefs, the literature has mainly
focused on one direction of causality, namely, the a¤ect of segregation on beliefs and atti-
tudes. However, while segregation can a¤ect beliefs, it is important to take into account
that segregation is often endogenous and may in itself depend on these beliefs. In par-
ticular, beliefs play an important role in many economic decisions that a¤ect segregation
in society. When people choose where to live, beliefs about crime rates and demographic
compositions of di¤erent neighborhoods are important.4 Indeed school choices -our main
application in this paper- tend to be persistent and a¤ected by parental background and
beliefs. Evans and Tilley (2011) nd that 43 per cent of the privately educated in the UK
who have children have sent them to private schools, nearly ve times the rate for parents
who went to state schools.
To better understand segregation and its e¤ect on beliefs, one has therefore to analyze
the coevolution of segregation and beliefs. In this paper we analyze the coevolution of seg-
regation in schools (private versus state), beliefs about the productivity of di¤erent school
graduates, and the e¤ect of this on labour market outcomes.5 Schools are important in
shaping beliefs as they involve intense socialization, where beliefs are formed and moulded
by peers and by teachers. Moreover, in many countries, communities are segregated by
the school choices of parents.6
3There is mounting evidence that segregation in western countries is on the rise. Reardon and Bischo¤
(2011) show the increased segregation in the US from 1970-2009. Chetty et al (2014) provide a snapshot
of segregation in the US and its e¤ect on social mobility. See also the Pew Research centre report on
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income/. Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2011) compute an isolation index and show how face-to-face segregation -in voluntary asso-
ciations, work, neighborhoods, family, trusted friends and political discussants- is much more signicant
as compared to the segregation implied by online and o­ ine news consumption.
4Dustmann and Preston (2001) show that earlier studies that have only looked at one direction of
causality, i.e., how segregation and social exclusion a¤ect beliefs and attitudes towards minorities, have
biased results due to neglecting location choices which depend on these beliefs.
5Private schools are termed independent or public in the UK, whereas state schools are termed public
schools in the US. To avoid confusion we then use the terms private and state schools.
6One example is the white ight to the suburbs in the US which is considered to be motivated
by the possibility of racial and socioeconomic segregation in schools. See Bradford and Kelejian (1973).
More recent evidence on sorting by income driven by school choice is provided in Epple and Sieg (1999)
and Calabrese, Epple, Romer and Sieg (2006). For e¢ ciency implications of this, see Calabrese, Epple
and Romano (2012).
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Importantly, the di¤erent attitudes and beliefs about school graduates have real be-
havioral implications in labour markets, through occupational choice and employment
decisions. For example, in the UK, private school male graduates are up to 10 per cent
more likely to land top jobs than state school graduates with the same grades from the
same university.7 Indeed, 50% of private school students believe that people that attend
their school will be very successfulin the world of work compared to 9% of state school
pupils.8 Similarly, in the US, private schools lead the tables in terms of placements into top
universities, even though students from private schools or selective state schools perform
no better than those in standard state schools in achievements tests.9
We analyse a model of non-overlapping generations with innite periods and three
stages in each period. In the peer inuence stage, segregation a¤ects beliefs: In this
stage, individualsbeliefs about schools are shaped by their parentsbeliefs and by their
school peers. In the labour market stage, discrimination may arise based on such beliefs:
Employers decide whether to hire an employee, given the school he graduated from and
their own beliefs about the schoolse¤ect on productivities. Labour market experience
also entail learning about true productivities. In the school choice stage, beliefs and
labour market discrimination a¤ect segregation choices: In this stage, parents choose
which school -state or private- to send their o¤spring to. The private school admits a
xed share of the population with the highest willingness to pay for the school.
Our analysis relies on two important behavioralassumptions. First, we assume that
pupils in schools have selection bias.10 In particular, we assume that individuals exchange
information only with those in the same school and neglect to take into account that the
selection into the school depends on beliefs.
Note that selection bias is not su¢ cient to create polarised beliefs as this depends on how
people select into schools. Our second assumption will imply homophily, which together
with selection bias will create the echo chamber e¤ect. Specically, we assume that
parents decide on the school for their child by using imperfect empathy, as in Bisin
and Verdier (2001).11 Parents base their decisions on their expectation about labour
7These facts are taken from a recent study by the Social Mobility and Poverty Commission in the UK,
which tracked 20,000 students. There is also evidence that state school graduates outperform compared
to the expectations about them, which is consistent with initial discrimination due to wrong beliefs and
subsequent adjustment of beliefs due to learning. See a 2014 report by HEFCE.
8https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/02/state-school-children-believe-privately-educated-p/
9See the 2007 study of the Centre of Education Policy, using NELS data from 1988-2000, which takes
family background into account. See also Abdulkadiro¼glu et al (2014) and Dobbie and Fryer (2014) who
show that peers with high achievements or a school racial mix have no e¤ect on pupilsattainment.
10For a recent experimental paper showing how peoples choices are a¤ected by selection bias see Enke
(2016).
11The imperfect empathy assumption is also related to papers looking at choices of beliefs in social
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market discrimination, but also on their expectations about how the school will a¤ect
their childs future beliefs and behaviour. Parents understand that the environment will
inuence their o¤springs beliefs but think that the optimal course of behaviour is the one
that follows their own beliefs (hence empathy is imperfect). This creates homophily, i.e.,
parents would rather their children segregate with like-minded others so that their childs
belief does not stray too much from their own.12 This endogenous homophily, along with
selection bias, will imply that beliefs can become polarised.
We are interested in the following questions: Are segregation and polarised beliefs
sustainable in the long run? That is, if some in society overestimate the productivity
di¤erences between state and private schools, do they indeed segregate so that beliefs
in society become heterogenous and polarised in the long term? Can such echo cham-
ber e¤ects overcome true learning in the labour market? What factors might unravel
segregation and discrimination in society?
We nd a simple necessary and su¢ cient condition that characterises when segregation,
polarised beliefs and discrimination persist in the long run. When the condition is satised,
in all equilibria, there are polarised beliefs about the productivity of graduates from the
di¤erent schools (over and above actual productivity di¤erences). Parents who send their
children to a private school believe that the di¤erence between the schools is higher than
what it really is. Parents who send their children to a state school realize that there is
discrimination, believe it is not justied, and are priced out of the private school. Finally,
those who went to the private (state) school will also send their children to the private
(state) school. Thus, the old boysnetwork is endogenously formed.13
The condition identies environments in which the echo chamber e¤ect outweighs true
learning.14 First, history matters; to create long run segregation and polarised beliefs,
those in the private school have to start from a relatively low opinion about state school
graduates. Second, the higher is the intensity of socialization in schools the easier it is
to create segregation and polarisation. Finally, polarised beliefs are easier to sustain the
interactions. Benabou and Tirole (2006) describe a model in which individuals (or parents) censor
information so as to distort their future selves(or childrens) beliefs. Levy and Razin (2012) model the
choice of whether to be religious or secular as a choice that a¤ects future beliefs. Benabou (2013) shows
that the choices of individuals to ignore information depend in equilibrium on otherschoices and on the
complementarities of their actions with others.
12For other approaches to homophily see Baccara and Yariv (forthcoming) and Peski (2008).
13Network e¤ects have also been mentioned as a possible reason for discrimination. Our analysis
endogenises such networks. See Granovetter (1974), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002), and Simon and
Warner (1992).
14Wrong beliefs arise in our model not because individuals stop experimenting, as in Piketty (1995)
or Fudenberg and Levine (1993), but because their peersbeliefs are pessimistic enough and thus the
echo chamber e¤ect outweighs any positive learning.
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less individuals learn about others from their labour market experience.
Importantly, the condition we identify is also necessary for segregation, implying that
the cycle of segregation and polarised beliefs can be broken down. This arises in our
model when those who segregate in the private school have su¢ ciently mixed beliefs so
that belief polarisation cannot arise.
Our key contribution in this paper is to analyze how segregation and beliefs, along with
discrimination, evolve endogenously.15 A recent literature in economics highlights the
role played by segregation in shaping beliefs in society, possibly through an echo chamber
e¤ect. For example, Golub and Jackson (2012) study how segregation a¤ects information
di¤usion in social networks when individuals use the DeGroot heuristic to update their
beliefs.16 They show that homophily slows down the convergence to a consensus in society.
Implicit in their analysis are selection bias and a correlation neglect bias that arises from
repeated communication.17
Our model highlights the fact that what is important for polarised beliefs across society
is that those with similar beliefs will segregate. In our model endogenous segregation can
result in homophily, and thus, given selection bias, induces polarised beliefs which then
further segregation. Related to this is a paper by Sethi and Yildiz (2016) who show how
beliefs can polarise when individuals choose which experts to listen to. In their model one
chooses a familiar expert from whom they can easily learn, whereas in our model an
individual chooses their network of individuals with similar beliefs so that their o¤springs
belief does not stray away too much from their own. We also show how such polarisation
in beliefs can have a direct and dynamically persistent e¤ect on economic outcomes such
as wages and employment.18
Our second contribution is to provide a model of socialisation, or peer inuence, which
relies on individuals learning from one another. The notion that physical proximity a¤ects
15Benabou (1993) and Epple and Romano (2008) focus on the relation between segregation in education
and complementarities: Benabou (1993) shows how segregation ine¢ ciently arises due to complementari-
ties in education, and Epple and Romano (2008) use complementarities in education and income to derive
segregation between state and private schools. We di¤er from this literature by focusing on beliefs as the
key element that fuels -and is fuelled by- segregation.
16See also Dandekar et al (2013).
17See also De Marzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) and Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) for theoretical
models of echo chamber e¤ects stemming from correlation neglect. See Enke and Zimmerman (2015) for
an experimental analysis of correlation neglect. In our model there is no correlation neglect. The naive
social learning literature has also focused on the e¤ects of non-Bayesian learning on whether societies
converge to have the right or wrong beliefs. See Eyster and Rabin (2010) and Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin
(2015).
18Polarisation of beliefs has also been considered in the political economy literature, namely its e¤ect
on political outcomes. See Barber and McCarty (2013) and Levy and Razin (2015).
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beliefs and social attitudes has been traditionally studied in sociology, psychology and
criminology and has been coined the Contact Hypothesis by Allport (1954). In this
spirit, our model also provides a rationale for school integration, over and above the
one explored in the economics literature (which focuses mainly on academic achievement
through peer e¤ects):19 In our model successful integration will change wrong stereotypes
and potentially unravel the cycle of wrong beliefs, stereotypes and discrimination in the
long-run.
The literature has provided many explanations for labour market discrimination. Sta-
tistical discrimination models follow either Arrow (1973), who focuses on self-fullling
beliefs, or Phelps (1972) who focuses on noisy information.20 In all these models indi-
vidualsbeliefs are correct at least on average. Our approach is di¤erent: We show how,
even in the absence of di¤erences, individuals may strongly believe that such di¤erences
exist. We provide a specic mechanism -endogenous segregation and the echo chamber
e¤ect- to illustrate how wrong beliefs overcome true information in the long run. Also
in this literature, Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) show
how investment in skills changes as a result of peer e¤ects in segregated neighborhoods.21
Our analysis is complementary: We endogenise segregation, and allow beliefs to be what
segregation exacerbates.22
We also add to the discrimination literature by shedding some light on common practices
in school and university admissions. Our condition identies environments in which, when
private schools admit pupils according to their willingness to pay, they will not necessarily
survive in the long-run. Alternative selection criteria, based on beliefs, values or culture,
will allow such schools to increase their long term survival. This accords with a common
practice of many private schools and universities in the UK and in the US which hold
interviews, often with parents as well, or have a legacy criterion for admission.
Note also that in our model discrimination is according to an acquired trait, such as the
19See for example Sacerdote (2011)
20For a survey on models of statistical discrimination see Fang and Moro (2010). Coate and Loury
(1993) and Moro and Norman (2004) are recent examples that follow Arrow (1973) to show how dis-
crimination or segregation arise due to self fullling asymmetric equilibria. Fryer and Jackson (2008) is a
recent example of a categorization model which can rationalize the use of stereotypes. Black (1995), and
Lang, Manove and Dickens (2005) analyze labour market discrimination with wrong beliefs, which can
result from noisier information. Peski and Szentes (2013) analyze spontaneous discrimination which
arises from repeated game considerations, without beliefs on productivity.
21Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) show how information about job opportunities ows in some
networks but not in others, resulting in discrimination. This is also related to the literature on identity,
as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
22Also related to self-fullling beliefs is the work on social assetsby Mailath and Postlewaite (2006).
In their work as in ours private education becomes valuable when others value it.
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school one had attended. The analysis can be extended to also include inherited traits
such as ethnicity, race or gender. We discuss these issues in Section 5.
2 The model
We consider a non-overlapping generations model with a continuum of dynasties, each
indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each dynasty consists of one individual at any period t 2 f1; :::g;
which at the end of the period is replaced by one o¤spring.
There are two kinds of schools, state and private. The focus of our analysis will be on
how (endogenous) segregation in di¤erent schools can foster polarised (and hence some-
times wrong) beliefs about the productivity of the graduates of the di¤erent schools. For
simplicity, we assume that whatever the school an individual goes to, his actual produc-
tivity is the same and equal to one. We extend the analysis to di¤erent productivities
later on. For the purpose of our analysis it is not important whether productivity arises
through innate ability, standard peer e¤ects, or through quality of teaching.23
We consider a simple form of beliefs. Assume that all dynasties believe that the pro-
ductivity of private school graduates is 1. They also believe that the productivity of a
state school graduate is either 0 or 1. Specically, at any date t  1, each dynasty holds
a belief that the productivity of graduates of state schools is 1 with probability qti 2 (0; 1]
and 0 otherwise, with some F t(:) describing the distribution of qti 2 (0; 1] in the popula-
tion. The beliefs of di¤erent dynasties will change within periods and across time as we
describe below, and we will analyse where beliefs and behaviour will converge to.
At any period t, all individuals go through the following phases:
Stage 1: Peer inuence in schools. Individuals start school with the belief qti inherited
from their parents. They communicate with peers and update their beliefs.
Stage 2: Labour market. School graduates become employees or employers and are
randomly matched. Employers observe the schooling history of employees and make
employment decisions given their beliefs. Employees and employers receive wage/prots
respectively. Labour market experience is potentially informative about the productivity
of state school graduates.
Stage 3: Parental school choice. Following labour market experience, individuals have
one o¤spring each, to which they transmit their beliefs. They then choose a school for
their o¤spring, private or state, to maximize their perceived o¤springs payo¤in the labour
market.
23There is a large literature on sorting in schools according to parental income and innate ability, which
can potentially a¤ect productivity. See for example Epple and Romano (1998). MacLeod and Urquiola
(2009) shows that even if private schools select a higher ability students, they then might invest lower
e¤ort so that the value added of the private school is low and overall productivity will not be much higher.
7
Note that individuals receive utility in the employment phase, in the form of wages
or prots, and when considering their o¤springs wages and prots in the next period.
Attending school does not in itself entail any utility.
We now describe the specic stages of the model.
2.1 Peer inuence in schools
Our key assumption is that there is peer inuence in schools and that pupils have selection
biaswhen updating their beliefs based on what they learn in school.24 To model peer
inuence, we consider a simple communication model in which individuals -in the same
school- transmit their beliefs qti truthfully to each other.
25 Specically, let f tJ(:) denote the
distribution over the inherited beliefs of pupils in school J 2 fs; pg at period t. We assume
that individual i in school J is randomly matched and exchanges beliefs with n others in
the same school. Sobel (2014) and Levy and Razin (2016) show that if individuals believe
that they had all started with a common uniform prior (on f0; 1g), and that their posterior
beliefs qti were formed by receiving private conditionally independent signals, then these
posterior beliefs are su¢ cient statistics for rational Bayesian updating. We can therefore
describe the evolution of beliefs of an individual i in school J at time t, from qti ; before he
interacts with others, to qti;g; after communicating with n peers and graduating, according
to the following process (for the proof that Bayesian updating results in the formulation
below, see Sobel 2014 and Levy and Razin 2016):
qti;g  (qt; qti) =
qti
Y
k=1;::;n
qtk
qti
Y
k=1;::;n
qtk + (1  qti)
Y
k=1;::;n
(1  qtk)
; (1)
where qt is a vector of beliefs (qt1; ::q
t
n) of length n; each belief drawn from f
t
J(:):
Note that individuals have a selection bias: They only learn from those that they
interact with while not taking into account that those who chose to attend the other
school may have di¤erent beliefs. This will play an important role if the school choice
24Peer inuence occurs among individuals in the same school only. As in the network literature which
assumes that individuals communicate with those they are connected to, in our model as well information
exchange arises only among those that interact with one another. An important di¤erence however is
that in our model the network, i.e., the identity of the individuals in the di¤erent schools, will be
endogenously determined by the parents, given their beliefs.
25While individuals exchange beliefs over the productivity of state school graduates, this can be more
generally thought of as exchanging views that our school is better than other schools, or that attending
a private school is the only way to succeed in life. We take the view therefore that exchanges between
individuals consist of transmission of beliefs, rather than signals, and, as in the social learning literature,
that such transmission is sincere.
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decision leads to segregation of beliefs. Apart from selection bias, the belief updating
process follows from Bayesian updating assuming conditional independence in the initial
beliefs. That is, there is no correlation neglect in the model.26 Denote by f tJ;g(:) the
distribution of beliefs of graduates from school J .
It is easy to see from (1) that the belief updating function satises the following prop-
erties. First, condent individuals are persuasive. For example, if some individual has
extreme beliefs at one or zero, then he fully convinces all others. Second, beliefs upon
graduation are monotone; they increase in the parents beliefs and in peersbeliefs. Fi-
nally, belief updating can also exhibit polarisation: For a set of beliefs where all are
higher (lower) than a half, then updated beliefs would be higher (lower) than the maxi-
mum (minimum) belief in the set. We will show later on that dynasties with pessimistic
beliefs will tend to segregate together; the feature of polarisation will then facilitate the
echo chamber e¤ect as an agglomeration of pessimistic beliefs will overcome true learning
in the labour market.
2.2 The labour market: employment and learning
In this model we show that polarisation and wrong beliefs can have real economic conse-
quences, and specically, we focus on labour market discrimination. As in Black (1995),
discrimination due to wrong beliefs will typically be characterised by losses for employers
and employees alike. State school employees will be discriminated against, whereas em-
ployers with wrong beliefs will incur loses due to suboptimal behaviour, e.g., they forgo
opportunities to employ. We focus on the simplest labour market interaction that delivers
these two features, but our results hold for a more general environment.
Specically, let school graduates at time t make up the two sides of the labour market.
Any individual, disregarding her education path, becomes an employer with probability
 and an employee with probability 1    (the analysis can be extended to asymmetric
probabilities). Employers and employees are matched randomly. To x ideas, let  < 1
2
, so
an employer is matched for sure, while an employee is matched with probability 
1  < 1
(this is not important and can be reversed).
We assume that an employee always prefers to work, while the employer decides whether
to employ the individual he is matched with. The gain for the employer is the productivity
of the employee, and the cost is a wage w (paid to the employee) drawn independently
for each match according to a uniform distribution on [0; 1].27 The randomness of the
26Note that given the continuum of dynasties, two dynasties will meet with probability 0. Thus,
conditional on initial beliefs being derived from independent sources, all future exchanged beliefs would
still be conditionally independent.
27The uniformity of the distribution is not essential for the results but simplies exposition. The
distribution needs to be full support.
9
wage is a simple way to model employers with wrong beliefs taking suboptimal actions.
In particular, an employer who is matched with a private school graduate, about which all
have correct beliefs, will always employ as w  1. On the other hand, an employer from
dynasty i will employ a state school graduate employee at time t only if w  qti;g: If an
employer decides not to employ, no prots or wages can be earned for that period. Thus,
whenever qti;g < 1, the behaviour of the employer is suboptimal as the true productivity of
the worker is 1: In the Appendix we extend the analysis to an alternative labour market
model in which wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
To stack the odds against wrong beliefs, we assume that the labour market experience
entails learning: Following the employment phase, all those who were either employed
by or employed a state school graduate, receive a signal that increases their beliefs. To
simplify the information structure, assume that individuals believe that the signal indi-
cates that the productivity of the employee/employer is 1 with accuracy  2 (0:5; 1): Post
employment, individuals then update beliefs to qti;e; which, by Bayes rule, is given by,
qti;e =
qti;g
qti;g + (1  qti;g)(1  )
if i was in an active match with a state school graduate,
(2)
and qti;e = q
t
i;g otherwise.Denote by f
t
e(:) the distribution of beliefs in the population as a
whole following the employment activity at time t.
2.3 Parental school choice
Following employment, individuals become parents, transmit their beliefs to their children,
i.e., qt+1i = q
t
i;e; and decide which school to send them to. Let 
t
i be the willingness to
pay of a parent from dynasty i for the private school. In other words, ti is the perceived
future payo¤ of the child in the labour market in period t + 1; conditional on attending
the private school, relative to that payo¤ conditional on attending the state school. The
parent will calculate this expected labour market payo¤from each school given her forecast
of how the o¤springs beliefs will change in each school, and her forecast of the behaviour
of employers in period t + 1. Importantly, the parent would compute ti given what she
believes to be the trueexpected state school productivity, qti;e: Note that a parent here
only cares about her direct o¤spring.
The willingness to pay ti (which we will derive formally in the next Section) will
consist of two components. First, in the model, state school graduate employees may be
discriminated against. If parents foresee this correctly, they will -disregarding their own
beliefs- prefer to send their child to a private school. Second, parents may understand
that their childs belief will change which will a¤ect his behaviour as an employer. Parents
will therefore prefer to send their children to the school that will induce the best beliefs
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from their own point of view because they are concerned about their o¤spring potentially
making a hiring error in the labour market. This assumption, of imperfect empathy,
implies that they would prefer their o¤springs beliefs to stay as close as possible to their
own. Such induced homophily would facilitate belief polarisation.
Note that even though parents realize that their o¤spring will be inuenced by others
beliefs, the parents themselves do not update their beliefs anymore. Imperfect empathy
implies old age rigidity of beliefs. This phenomenon is recently documented in the
literature (see Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015). In our model, young individuals are inu-
enced by the environment they grow up in, but when they grow old and after they have
accumulated job market experience, parents believe that their assessment is the correct
one. They are aware however that the environment they choose to raise their children in
(that is, the school they send them to), will a¤ect their childrens beliefs and hence their
future behaviour.
We model school choice in the following simple way: We assume that at any time
t; the private school admits a share  of individuals with the largest ti; conditional on
ti  0 (and the largest share feasible subject to ti  0 if this constraint is satised for a
share lower than ): Thus, the school admits all those with the largest willingness to pay,
subject to the schools capacity constraint.
Note that we abstract away from any income di¤erences that might prevent some from
attending the private school. Income di¤erences will only exacerbate segregation (see
the discussion in Section 4.1). For now, dynasties only di¤er in their beliefs, which will
determine their willingness, but not their ability, to pay for the private school.
2.4 Equilibrium denition
An equilibrium in the innite game given some initial state in Period 1 (an allocation
of a measure  of dynasties to the private school) is a dynamic process of school peer
inuence, labour market behaviour, and parental school choice, in which, at any period
t; the following is satised:
(i) Optimal employers behaviour : At any period t = 1; 2; ::; employers employ state
school graduates only if w  qti;g and always employ private school graduates.
(ii) Belief updating: For each dynasty i; and period t = 1; 2; ::; ; qti is updated to q
t
i;g
according to (1) given the distribution of beliefs f tp() and f
t
s() in period t = 1; 2:::; and
qti;g is updated following employment to q
t
i;e according to (2).
(iii) Correct parental beliefs and optimal school choice: Parents at period t = 1; 2; :::
compute ti using imperfect empathy and their own beliefs q
t
i;e; given a correct expecta-
tions of how their o¤springs beliefs will change in each school, and the correct expectation
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of the equilibrium behaviour of employers in period t + 1.28 The measure  of dynasties
with the highest ti are admitted to the private school.
Proposition 0: An equilibrium exists.29
3 Segregation, polarisation and discrimination
Where will society converge to in the long run? To answer this question we need to put
some structure on the initial distribution of beliefs and allocation to schools. We consider
the following initial state: In Period 1 there is a proportion  in the private school with
beliefs q1i = q < 1 and a proportion 1    in the state school with beliefs q1i = 1. Given
this simple initial state, we will now characterise all long-run equilibria. We then show
how the result extends to other initial states, see the remark below.
We start with a benchmark in which there is no peer inuence in schooling. This case
can be modeled by assuming that peers do no a¤ect each othersbeliefs, so that n = 0.
The next result characterises the long term distribution of beliefs in any sequence of
equilibria.30
Proposition 1: Let n = 0: In any sequence of equilibria all dynasties converge to have
beliefs at q1i = 1:
When there is no interaction in school, a dynastic belief can only change in the labour
market, and this is due to true learning. As any dynasty with wrong beliefs will always
learn with a strictly positive probability, all dynasties will converges to have beliefs which
put probability one on the truth. Therefore, to sustain long run polarisation of beliefs,
we must have peer inuence in schools.
Assume now that n > 0: Our main result characterizes a simple necessary and su¢ cient
condition on q : When it is low enough society will converge to polarised beliefs, and if it
is high enough all will converge to have the same -true- belief.
28That is, parents know the present distribution of beliefs f te(:); the equilibrium school choices of other
parents (and hence the correct distribution of beliefs in school J in period t + 1; f t+1J (:)), and have the
correct forecast of the distribution of beliefs following graduation from school J; f t+1J;g (:):
29All proofs are in the Appendix.
30This result holds for any initial state.
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Proposition 2: Let n > 0 and let
q( ; n)  (1  )
1
n

1
n + (1  ) 1n :
Then: (i) Polarisation: Whenever q  q( ; n); in all equilibria, a constant set of
dynasties of measure  attends the private school, discriminates against state school grad-
uates, and has beliefs that converge to a degenerate distribution on 0. (ii) No Polar-
isation: Whenever q > q( ; n); in all equilibria, all individuals converge to have the
same, correct, beliefs. (iii) Comparative Statics: The cuto¤ q( ; n) decreases in  ;
the intensity of learning in the labour market, and increases in n; the intensity of peer
inuence.
Other initial states: (i) The result remains exactly the same if in the initial state
the dynasties in the private school do not have the same beliefs but some distribution of
beliefs over (0; q]: (ii) The result remains exactly the same if the initial state is generalized
to allow initial wrong beliefs in the state school as well. We show this in Proposition 2A
in the Appendix.
A su¢ cient level of initial segregation can therefore lead to long-run segregation, po-
larised beliefs, and labour market discrimination. Even if dynasties are exposed to many
positive signals, or get relatively accurate information in the labour market (a higher );
they are also exposed to many negative beliefs of peers about the productivity of state
school graduates. The tendency of individuals to exchange information with like-minded
individuals (which arises in our model due to imperfect empathy) leads to the echo cham-
ber e¤ect which overcomes new and true information that is learned in the labour market.
When q  q( ; n); in all equilibria the process of convergence to extreme beliefs is
characterized by a constant set of private school dynasties that send their o¤spring to the
private school, have beliefs that converge to the lowest value, and employ private school
graduates with a higher probability than state school graduates.
How does endogenous segregation persist to polarise beliefs su¢ ciently in the long run?
And when does it break? For segregation to arise, beliefs in the private school have to be
su¢ ciently low throughout time. In other words, dynasties with su¢ ciently low beliefs
need to have the highest willingness to pay for the private school (compared with others
in the population). On the other hand, the process of segregation and belief polarisation
would break down if the distribution of beliefs in both schools are su¢ ciently mixed, in
other words, when it is not necessarily the dynasties with the lowest beliefs that choose
to attend the private school. To see how the simple condition above determines in which
environments these cases arise, we need to understand the trade-o¤s facing the parents
when they consider their school choice.
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Consider ti; the relative labour market benet from sending a child to the private
school vis a vis the state school. The parent in dynasty i will compute her o¤springs
utility given her own beliefs, qti;e; and her forecast of how the o¤springs beliefs will change
in each school, depending on her forecast of the behaviour of employers in period t+ 1.
Suppose that at period t the beliefs of those in the state school are still all at one, as
in the initial state. In equilibrium, a parent realises that at period t + 1; all employers
hire a private school graduate employee, and that a state school employer hires all. There
are therefore two events in which school choice is relevant. First, with probability (1  
) 
1  =  the o¤spring becomes an employee and is matched with an employer who
is a private-school graduate. In this case, if she herself went to the private school she
is employed for sure (and receives in expectations a wage equal to 1
2
), but if she went
to the state school she will only be employed with some probability (and thus receive
a lower wage on average). Specically, she is employed by an individual from dynasty
l only if w  qt+1l;g . Thus, given the (correct) equilibrium future distribution f t+1p;g (:) of
private-school graduatesemployers from dynasties l and their beliefs qt+1l;g , the relative
benet from attending a private school in this case is:
1
2
  wt+1 (3)
where wt+1
Z 1
0
[
Z qt+1l;g
0
wdw] f t+1p;g (q
t+1
l;g ) dq
t+1
l;g 
1
2
This term 1
2
  wt+1 is non-negative and would induce all parents to prefer to send their
child to the private school. As long as there are heterogenous beliefs in the population,
state school graduates employees are discriminated against and it is better to attend a
private school.
The second case in which a benet or a loss from attending a private school arises,
is when the o¤spring becomes an employer and is matched with an employee who is a
state school graduate. This happens with probability (1  ). If she is a private school
graduate, she would employ the state school graduate if w  qt+1i;g = (qt+1; qti;e). Upon
employing, she would pay some w  qt+1i;g ; and gain -from the point of view of her parent-
an expected payo¤ of qti;e w: Taking expectations over all possible peer inuence vectors,
qt+1, going to the private school in this event would generate:
ti 
Z
qt+1
[
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   w)dw] f t+1p;n (qt+1) dqt+1;
which depends on the school choices of other parents or in other words the expected
equilibrium distribution over vectors of length n of peer beliefs in the private school,
f t+1p;n (q
t+1). If on the other hand the individual is a state school graduate, she would
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employ the matched state school graduate for sure, gaining -in the eyes of her parent-
an expected net payo¤ of qti;e   12 . Thus, the relative gain/loss from attending a private
school in this event is:
^ti  ti   (qti;e  
1
2
): (4)
This term ^ti embodies the imperfect empathy assumption, and can be negative or
positive. If the beliefs of the parent are low, the induced behaviour of the o¤spring if
she goes to the state school is far worse than that induced by the private school, yielding
^ti > 0: However, if the beliefs of the parent are relatively high, sending the child to a
private school might represent a loss as peer inuence might substantially decrease the
o¤springs beliefs. When qti;e = 1 then ^
t
i = 0; as in this case (q
t+1; qti;e) = 1 for all q
t+1.
Putting (3) and (4) together, we have that given a parental belief qti;e; the benet from
a private school vis a vis a state school is:
ti = (
1
2
  wt+1) + (1  )^ti (5)
The value of q( ; n) insures that dynasties in the private school, following peer inuence
and labour market experience, will end up with lower beliefs than they had started with. As
this process continues, their beliefs will converge to zero. At the same time this also implies
that these dynasties want to send their children to private schools more than state school
parents do. Specically, we show that when the beliefs of all dynasties i in the private
school are low enough, then ^ti > 0; implying that there will be no contaminationor
replacement by individuals with beliefs at 1.
Our result also shows when endogenous segregation break down. Specically, we nd
that if the condition is not satised, then those who segregate in the private school have
su¢ ciently mixed beliefs so that belief polarisation cannot arise. To see how this comes
about, suppose that initial beliefs are above q( ; n): This implies that while the belief of
some may decrease (if for example they do not hire a state school graduate), there would
be a share of individuals for whom beliefs, following peer inuence and labour market
experience, will increase. But under a contemplated segregation, beliefs of many in the
private school must converge to zero; this implies that for the dynasties whose beliefs keep
increasing with time, peer inuence in the private school would, at some point, induce
a large swing in beliefs (and thus suboptimal future labour market behaviour). In other
words, we would have that for some private school dynasties, ^ti < 0: But for state school
parents ^ti = 0, as their o¤spring is not inuenced in the private school. Therefore, state
school parents will have higher willingness to pay for the private school and will be able to
send their o¤spring there. A process of contamination of beliefs will start and segregation
will eventually break down.31
31The fact that the school has a capacity constraint and always admits a xed share  is not important
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In reality, segregation would not be that easy to break. It might be that new entrants to
the private school from state school dynasties would not immediately interact with others
and fully convince them, as the literature on within school segregationdiscusses (see
Echenique et al 2006). Even informal interactions may depend on background, beliefs,
or income. This implies that segregation is underestimated in the model or that its
breakdown would be a slow process. We discuss in Section 4.1 other ways which make
polarisation and segregation harder to break.
Unequal productivities: We now consider a simple extension of the model that
illustrates that what is important in our analysis is not the fact that productivities in the
two schools are equal, but that individuals might overestimate the di¤erences.
Suppose that the true productivity of state school graduates is some  < 1 (while
that of private school graduates is 1, known to all): Thus beliefs at period t are that
the productivity of state school graduates is  with some probability qti > 0, and zero
otherwise. We again start with the initial condition that in Period 1, a share  is in the
private school and believe that state school productivity is  with probability q1i = q < 1
and a share 1    is in the state school and has beliefs q1i = 1: We can then extend our
proof of Proposition 2 in a straightforward way to show more generally:
Proposition 3: Suppose that the true productivity of state school graduates is  < 1:
Then Proposition 2 holds.
Note that true beliefs in this case would imply that individuals would prefer to hire
private school graduates. However, if we start from su¢ cient segregation in beliefs across
schools, then in the long run wrong beliefs will persist and polarise, and we would have dis-
crimination over and above what it should be. This again would be a result of endogenous
segregation of specic dynasties with su¢ ciently low beliefs.
4 Discussion
We rst discuss factors that increase the instances of polarisation, segregation and dis-
crimination. We then discuss policies that can reduce the occurrence of such phenomena.
4.1 The persistence of polarisation and segregation
Segregation and long run polarised beliefs may be underestimated in our model. We now
discuss some factors which, in reality, may increase its occurrence.
for this result. More generally, if the private school admits those with the highest willingness to pay (as
all pricing mechanisms would), those with the wrongbeliefs for the school will eventually enter.
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Interviews and the legacy criterion: Proposition 2 had illustrated that segregation
will eventually break down if the initial state does not consist of su¢ ciently many indi-
viduals with low beliefs in the private school. The reason for this is that the willingness
to pay to the private school of some with intermediate beliefs will at some point become
lower than those with very high beliefs, implying a contamination of the pool of beliefs in
the private school. This would hold with more general pricing mechanisms that rely on
willingness to pay.
One strategy of private schools to avert this is to base admittance on the actual beliefs
held by the dynasty member. Accepting those with low enough beliefs may not maximize
prots, but will certainly maximize the chances of survival of the private school. Our
model can then shed light on why many private schools and top universities use interviews
or legacy criteria for admissions. In the prism of our model, interviews allow schools to
screen students according to views and family values, making sure that only those with the
rightbeliefs or values are admitted.32 A legacy criteria allows universities to maintain
a signicant cohort in the school coming from the same families, which allows the school
to better control and protect specic values and belief systems.33
Income e¤ects: We have abstracted away from income e¤ects. It is clear that an
unequal distribution of income or wealth would only exacerbate segregation. The private
school is the costly school. Even if a parent from a state school dynasty has a higher
willingness to pay for the private school compared with a parent from a private school
dynasty, she may not have the means to do it. This implies that it may not be as easy to
break segregation as we had described above
Another element in our model which is a¤ected by income is learning on the job market.
If getting a placement in a company demands a period of unpaid internship, then those
with low income -which by denition are more likely to be in state education- are less
likely to be able to a¤ord it. This means that there are less opportunities to learn about
their type.
4.2 How to stop segregation and polarisation?
In our model, segregation and polarised beliefs induce ine¢ ciencies: Discrimination is
distortionary as state schools graduates miss employment opportunities, while private
32Indeed, web sites that provide advice for private schools prospective students in the UK explain
that it is important to mention in an interview that previous generations in the family have attended the
school. Interview advice for the parents themselves includes expect to talk about yourself..remember to
discuss long term values for your child.
33The Ivy League institutions are estimated to admit 10% to 30% of each entering class using this
factor. The former president of Harvard University, Larry Summers, has stated: Legacy admissions are
integral to the kind of community that any private educational institution is.
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school employers miss opportunities to employ.
As discussed above, income e¤ects, school ethos, or other network e¤ects can all play a
role to increase segregation. What can decrease its incidence? We discuss some possibili-
ties below.
The long-term e¤ects of integration: The literature on integration in schools
has mainly focused on academic achievements of participants as the potential benet
of integration (see Sacerdote 2011 and Angrist and Lang 2004). Our analysis suggests
that integration might have long-term e¤ects: In our model, integration in schools would
a¤ect the beliefs of individuals through peer inuence and so their behaviour in the labour
market later on in their lives. A recent empirical literature shows how beliefs indeed evolve
as a result of integration (see Boisjoly et al 2006, Kaufman and Harris 2015, La Ferrara
et al 2014 and Algann et al 2015).
As with the potential e¤ect of integration on academic achievement, the actual level of
interaction among the di¤erent students is important. If for example pupils from state
school dynasties are integrated into a private school but interact only with one another,
the beliefs of the private school dynasties will not be a¤ected. Thus, integration has to
be happening in practice for such policies to have an e¤ect.
Labour market and anti-discrimination policies: Proposition 2 shows that better
learning in the labour market (captured by the parameter ) will increase the instances in
which we have convergence to long run wrong beliefs. This can arise for example when we
have a longer probation period for employees before they can be let o¤, so that employers
can learn better about state school graduates.
Our framework also allows us to assess common anti-discrimination policy interventions.
Consider a simple policy which induces private school employers to hire more graduates
from state schools. One way to model the consequences of such a policy is to assume that
a private school employer hires a state school graduate if w < qti;g+; for some  > 0: This
can be thought of as a subsidy given to an employer who hires a state school graduate or
a punishment for the employer who does not abide by anti-discrimination laws. In any
case, the instances of hiring state school graduates by employers would increase.
While this policy will surely decrease discrimination, it will not have a direct e¤ect on
the incidence of segregation and polarisation. Specically, the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for segregation we had derived above will not be a¤ected by : The condition
is computed at the worst case scenario for segregation, in which a state school graduate
is hired in any case. Whenever the condition is satised, then in all equilibria beliefs in
the private school will converge to zero and state school graduates will be employed by
private employers i¤ w < : As long as  < 1; some discrimination will persist. Thus,
18
anti-discrimination policies -as long as they are not absolute and fully enforced- would be
more e¤ective coupled with policies that also a¤ect beliefs directly.
Vouchers, subsidies and scholarships: The US educational voucher system has
been heavily scrutinized; vouchers give individuals the money to attend a private or a
charter school. The key argument for vouchers is that school choice improves competition
and as a result can have a positive e¤ect on public schools as well. The key argument
against vouchers is that of cream skimming, as the best students would leave the public
system.34 Our analysis can provide a complementary way to look at the e¤ect of vouchers
or subsides.
While most US states have provided vouchers to low-income families or in specic
school districts, a recent Nevada program is the most far-reaching, incentivizing parents
to abandon public schools with annual $5,100 education savings accounts (ESAs) for
private schooling - regardless of household wealth or income level. Note however that if
such vouchers are given to all, it is still the case that individuals would di¤er in their
willingness to pay for the private school. The private school through its pricing will
naturally choose those with the highest willingness to pay. This system will therefore
have a minimal e¤ect in our model. In the equilibria with segregation, private schools
could charge a sum on top of $5,100, which would reect the willingness to pay of those
with low beliefs.35
Consider then the more traditional voucher system according to which subsidies are
given only to those with low-income, who typically attend state schools. Consider an
equilibrium with segregation in which at some period t; all dynasties with beliefs below
qt attend the private school. If the voucher or subsidy given to state school dynasties
is su¢ cient to overcome the di¤erence in the willingness to pay between a state school
dynasty and the highest type qt in the private school, the segregation equilibrium may
break down. But as we show below, long-term segregation equilibria may still arise. The
reason is that those with lower beliefs always have a higher willingness to pay than those
with higher beliefs, and that this wedge increases when private schools become more
exclusive.
Note that in our model the highest expected utility an individual can gain in the labour
market is 1
2
, either from being an employer who pays the expected wage for the most
productive employee, or from being an employee who gains the highest expected wage.
We therefore consider vouchers with value V 2 [0; 1
2
):
34See Hoxby (1994).
35Indeed More than 80% of Nevada private schools cost an average of $4,800 more than the voucher
amount each year, according to a survey by Educate Nevada Now.
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Proposition 4: For any voucher value V < 1
2
; there exist a cuto¤ qV ( ; n); with
qV ( ; n) decreasing in V , q

0( ; n) = q
( ; n) as dened in Proposition 2 and q
V! 1
2
( ; n)!
0; such that long-term segregation arises in all equilibria when all dynasties with q 
qV ( ; n) attend the private school.
In the Appendix we show that in any equilibrium with segregation, the willingness to
pay for dynasties in the private school increases (compared to state school dynasties)
when the school is more exclusive (so that the cuto¤ is lower). Thus segregation can still
arise, but the set of long term equilibria with segregation will be smaller. This can be
determined endogenously by the private schools, as following the introduction of vouchers,
they can respond by making entry more exclusive (by using interviews, testing for ability
etc.). The incentive of schools to do so stems from the fact that they can only make prots
if there is polarisation of beliefs in society.
The winners and losers from segregation: One feature of the basic model is that
when school fees are taken into account, then in the long term, private school dynasties
have a lower per period utility than state school dynasties. While private school graduates
enjoy a better employment market, they also pay private school fees which extract their
willingness to pay. This willingness to pay however is in part based on wrong beliefs which
is not recuperated in the market later on.
This may be an artefact of the simple model we are using, as we had stacked the model
against segregation and its benets. As discussed above, fees may be lower and still
prevent state school dynasties from entering if for example admission policies are partly
based on interviews. This would imply that the willingness to pay of private school parents
is not extracted. In addition, the constraint in our model that state school dynasties need
to be deterred from entry with a low willingness to pay may be exaggerated: they may
have high willingness to pay but no means to do so, due to income e¤ects discussed
above. In a more general model, wrong beliefs can also be two-sided, that is, state school
dynasties may also overestimate the benets of state schools. Thus state school dynasties
can lose as employers as well.
Even so, it might be true that private education is indeed not benecial in reality.
Recent data in the UK supports the observation that private schools are not benecial on
average, when parental background and school fees are taken into consideration.36
36A report by the Social Market Foundation calculated that the higher educational achievement
and university degrees accrued by private school pupils translated to £ 193,000 in higher earn-
ings between the ages of 26 and 42. After adjusting for family background and social circum-
stances, the private school pay advantage was £ 57,000. However, ten years worth of average
private school fees in 1980 would be similar in scale -around £ 56,000 in todays prices. See
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jul/03/subsidy-independent-school-fees.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyse a model of the coevolution of segregation and polarisation of
beliefs. Our model is one of segregation along acquired traits which ts many applications
including primary and secondary schooling (private versus state, secular versus religious).
Higher education is another good example. The forces that shape segregation and beliefs
in our model could be behind what some have dubbed the higher education bubble.37
Segregation often occurs along inherited traits, such as race, ethnicity or gender. An
interesting line of research would be to add inherited traits into our analysis. In a world
in which it is illegal to discriminate along such traits, schooling and location choices might
be used as proxies to allow de facto segregation and discrimination to persist.
In practice, the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have been used to challenge
alleged "educational discrimination" practices. A famous example is Griggs v. Duke
Power Company from 1971, in which the employer had adopted a high-school diploma
requirement for all positions in four of its ve departments without "meaningful study"
of its "relationship to job-performance ability", based on the untested belief that doing
so would "improve the overall quality of the work force." The Court decided that the
requirement was unlawful because it had a disparate impact on African Americans, who
had high school diploma rates far lower than Whites in the relevant geographical area,
and because the requirement was not job related for the positions in question and consis-
tent with business necessity. The Court stated:38 "The evidence...shows that employees
who have not completed high school...have continued to perform satisfactorily and make
progress in departments for which the high school...criterion [is] now used...The facts of
this case demonstrate...the inrmity of using diplomas or degrees as xed measures of ca-
pability. History is lled with examples of men and women who rendered highly e¤ective
performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of certicates,
diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated
the commonsense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality." The courts
and the EEOC have applied the holding in Griggs consistently, and Congress conrmed
it when it amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 0: At any period t; construct the self correspondence   : [0; 1]!
2[0;1] in the following way. For any set of beliefs S of measure  that is composed of
37http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/04/higher_education
38Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-33.
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intervals in [0; 1]; the correspondence assigns a measure  of dynasties that have the
highest ti; given that the set S attends the private school.
39 To complete the description
of the correspondence, assign any individual that is indi¤erent between attending the
state and private school to the private school. For any S;  (S) is never empty. Thus, this
correspondence is closed. Moreover, the set [0; 1] is compact. By Ok (2004), the set [0; 1]
has the xed set property so that every closed self correspondence has a xed set. We
can therefore always construct a sequence of xed sets for t = 1; 2; ::::
Proof of Proposition 1: At period 1 all dynasties in the private school have beliefs
at q1i = q where q > 0: Note that as n = 0 for all such dynasties, q
t
i > q. Any dynasty at
period t has a strictly positive probability, bounded below by q(1   ); of employing a
state school graduate and therefore updating their belief to q
t
i
qti+(1 qti)(1 ) > q
t
i : Therefore,
all dynasties will converge to a belief q1i such that q
1
i =
q1i 
q1i +(1 q1i )(1 ) , q
1
i = 1:
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof below uses notation that is introduced in Section
3 in the discussion that follows the statement of Proposition 2.
Preliminaries: For short, let q( ; n)  q: Note that: (i) the condition in the Propo-
sition implies that q < 0:5; (ii) When the individual with beliefs q interacts in the worst
case scenario with n other individuals with the same beliefs, his beliefs upon graduation
become qg  q
n+1
qn+1+(1 q)n+1 < q
 (as q < 0:5). If such an individual later on em-
ploys a state school graduate, his beliefs post-employment become qe =
qg
qg+(1 qg)(1 ) . If
qg
qg+(1 qg)(1 ) = q
, then the dynastys beliefs at the end of the period are still at q < 1
2
:
The condition in the Proposition insures that
qg
qg+(1 qg)(1 ) = q
: It is easy to check that
the mapping of q to qg
qg+(1 qg)(1 ) has a unique xed point q
 on (0,1); and moreover
that for all q < q; qg
qg+(1 qg)(1 ) < q; and for all q > q
; qg
qg+(1 qg)(1 ) > q: Note that q

represents the worst case scenario, so that dynasties that will not experiment, will have
lower beliefs than q:
With some abuse of notation, let t1 denote the relative benet from the private school
of individuals with beliefs at 1.
Su¢ ciency: We know from the above that beliefs in the private school always remain
below q < 1
2
:We will now show that for all qti;e <
1
2
; given that beliefs in the private school
are interior, then ^ti > ^
t
1 = 0, and thus only the original set of dynasties will continue
to attend the private school, and individuals from the state school will not contaminate
39Note that at period t the domain of the set of beliefs is not necessarily connected but it is closed and
bounded.
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beliefs in the private school. We therefore need to show that:
^ti
=ti   (qti;e  
1
2
)
=
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1)  (qti;e  
1
2
) > 0;
where F t+1p;n (q
t+1) is the distribution over vectors qt+1 of length n of beliefs of children in
the private school as inherited from their parents (recall that qt+1i = q
t
i;e):
Note however that qti;e <
1
2
; and that
R (qt+1;qti;e)
0 (q
t
i;e   w)dw = (qt+1; qti;e)qti;e  
(qt+1; qti;e)
2=2 > 0 as such function is strictly concave, is maximised at qti;e; and (q
t+1; qti;e) 
qti;e as beliefs in the private school are lower than a half. This implies that ^
t
i > 0:
40
Finally note that the beliefs in the private school would converge to the singleton 0
as they are always below a half. This concludes the su¢ ciency part as the measure 
of private school dynasties dynasties will have a strictly high willingness to pay for the
private school compared with state school dynasties.
Necessity: Suppose that the condition in the proposition is violated so that [ q
1 q ]
n 1 >
1 

. This implies that q > q and that at any point in time, all those in (q; q]; if they
draw only peers from this set, will have new beliefs that are higher then what they started
with. In particular, one can nd sequences of dynasties whose beliefs will converge to one.
We will show that this implies that we can nd a positive measure of such dynasties, for
whom eventually ^ti < ^
t
1 = 0:
Note that given the binary state of nature, dynasties must converge to have beliefs on
zero, one or a half (the latter can arise as if all have beliefs at a half, then the updated
beliefs will be half as well). We next show that long term segregation implies that a
strictly positive measure of dynasties will converge to beliefs of zero.
First note that if long term segregation exists, it cannot be that almost all dynasties
converge to have beliefs at one. If this is the case then the benet from sending ones
child to the private school, for any parent, will converge to that of state school parents.
The next step is to note that if the measure of dynasties whose beliefs converge to zero
goes to zero, then it must be that the measure of dynasties whose beliefs converge to one,
goes to one. To see this note that if there was in the limit a strictly positive measure of
40We have used the uniform distribution of wages in computing
R (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   w)dw. In fact any
distribution that rst order stochastically dominates the uniform will satisfy the condition. For other
distributions, one would potentially need to add another condition to insure that no contamination
arises but there would always be a low enough initial q that would satisfy such condition. The necessary
part does not depend on the uniform distribution at all.
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dynasties with beliefs converging to a half, this would unravel as these dynasties would
learn from work experience with strictly positive probability, and their beliefs would drift
towards one.
We will now look at the strictly positive measure of dynasties initially at (q; q] whose
beliefs are increasing and show that as a measure 
2
of other dynasties have beliefs below
"; then their loss from peer inuence in the private school is large.
To do so, we focus on such dynasties initially in (q; q] whose beliefs increase su¢ ciently
slow so that others can converge to have beliefs below ": Specically, note that by choosing
which individuals in the private school members of a dynasty interact with each period,
and whether they learn in the labour market, we can construct a feasible sequence of
beliefs for a dynasty fqtig1t=1 that lingers as long as we wish below a half, i.e. for any T
we can nd such a sequence such that qti ! 1 but such that qti < 0:5 for any t < T . Note
further that by continuity of (qt+1; qti;e) and full support we can also construct a whole
set of such sequences all going to one in a similar rate.
Note now that for dynasty i at time t with beliefs qti;e we have:
^ti   ^t1
=
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   1)dw) 
Z 1
(qt+1;qti;e)
(1  w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1) + (1  qti;e)
< 
Z
qt+1
(
Z 1
(qt+1;qti;e)
(1  w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1) + (1  qti;e)
Now choose " and T" such that a measure 2 of dynasties have beliefs below ": Note
that if i interacts with n of these dynasties, the measure of all such interactions is (
2
)n:
Choose a sequence of a strictly positive measure of dynasties whose beliefs converge to
one slow enough so that at T" their distance from one is  > 0 such that (qt+1; qti;e) is at
most 2": Then we will have:
^ti   ^t1 <  (

2
)n
Z 1
2"
(1  w)dw +  < 0
whenever " and  are low enough (note that  does not depend on "): Thus in the next
period a strictly positive measure of state school parents will send their kids to the private
school.
Once a strictly positive measure of dynasties with beliefs at 1 enter the school, this will
be the case for all future periods (as from that point onwards, the measure of dynasties
with beliefs less than 1 is smaller than ): They will then infectwhoever they meet
and so all dynasties will converge to beliefs of 1 which is a contradiction to long term
segregation.
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Proof of Proposition 2A: We now prove the results stated following Proposition 2
in the text, extending the initial condition to two cases. First, note that as case (i) states,
if initial beliefs are in (0; q]; then nothing in the proof above changes. We now consider
case (ii), where the initial beliefs in the state school are in [q; 1] and the initial beliefs in
the private school are in (0; q]:
Let now t1 denote the relative benet from the private school to a dynasty with
beliefs at 1. Note rst that whenever q is su¢ ciently low and q is su¢ ciently high, then
^tl   ^t1  0 for any dynasty l with qtl;e > q:
To see why note that in the state school, the beliefs of a dynasty always increase, as
all other beliefs are greater than a half. This implies that the lowest bound on utility is
attained when (qt+1; qtl;e) = 1: For q
t
l;e = 1  ; this utility for the event of becoming an
employer and hiring a state school graduate amounts to 1      3
4
: On the other hand,
the best utility for this type in the private school would be when the interaction is with
the highest type, q: If the resulting beliefs, satisfy q
n(1 )
qn(1 )+(1 q)n < 1   2; then the
utility from this best interaction is lower implying that ^tl < ^
t
1 = 0. This arises when
qn
(1 q)n <
1 2
2(1 ) : For a small enough ; this holds for all small enough q
 < 1
2
; which is
satised by our condition. Thus ^tl   ^t1  0:
This implies that for long term segregation, we need ^tl > ^
t
1 = 0; for all q
t
l;e  q;
while we know that segregation breaks down if ^tl < ^
t
1 = 0 for some q
t
l;e > q
 which had
attended the private school at period t.
Consider the su¢ ciency then. If in equilibrium the same original dynasties in the private
school remain in the private school, beliefs only decrease and converge to zero. To see
that these dynasties remain in the school we need to show for any dynasty i in the private
school, that ^ti > ^
t
1 = 0 at any t; conditional on the set of dynasties in the private school
remaining below q: Taking into consideration the distribution over vectors of beliefs in
the state school, F t+1s;n (q
t+1); the condition then becomes:Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1) 
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e w)dw)dF t+1s;n (qt+1) > 0
Note that as above, the left element (the gain from the private school) is bounded from
below by 0. On the other hand, for q su¢ ciently high, the best case scenario is for beliefs
to end up at
qti;eq
n
qti;eq
n+(1 qti;e)(1 q)n ! 1 yielding a limit of a negative utility of q
t
i;e  0:5: Thus
the condition above is satised.
Now consider the necessity. When segregation arises, as in the proof of Proposition 2,
we can repeat the same proof as above, as for segregation to hold in the long term it is
a necessary condition that ^ti   ^t1  0. The only issue may arise if the dynasty whose
beliefs increase and we follow is being replaced by a state school dynasty with some q < 1;
we then continue to follow this new private school dynasty with these beliefs.
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Proof of Proposition 3: There are now three events in which the education path is
relevant on the equilibrium path. First, with probability (1  ) 
1  =  the individual
becomes an employee and is matched with an employer who is a private-school graduate.
In this case, if she herself went to a private school she is employed for sure (and receives
an expected wage of a half), but if she went to a state school she will only be employed
with some probability. Specically, she is employed by an individual from dynasty l only
if w < qt+1l;g . Thus, given some conjectured f
t+1
g (:); the future distribution of employers
beliefs, the relative benet for attending a private school in this case is:
1
2
  wt+1 0 (6)
where wt+1
Z 1
0
(
Z qt+1l;g
0
wdw)f t+1p;g (q
t+1
l;g )dq
t+1
l;g
Second, with probability (1  ) 
1  (1  ) = (1  ); a graduate would meet a state
school employer who would always employ a private school graduate but would only
employ the state school graduate if w <  , i.e., the di¤erence is:
1
2
 
Z 
0
wdw =
1
2
  
2
2
:
The third case in which a benet or a loss from attending a private school arises, is
when an individual becomes an employer and is matched with an employee who is a
state school graduate (which happens with probability (1  )). If she is a state school
graduate herself, she would employ him if w < ; gaining -in the eyes of her parent-
expected productivity of qti;e while paying in expectations

2
. On the other hand, if she
is a private school graduate, she would employ only if w < qt+1i;g . Upon employing, she
would pay some w < qt+1i;g ; and gain -from the point of view of her parent- productivity
of qti;e: Thus we have that in this event the gain/loss from attending a private school, is:
^ti  ti  
Z 
0
(qti;e   w)dw = ti   (qti;e  

2
) (7)
where ti is the expected gain, in the eyes of the parent, from the o¤spring being a private
school graduate employer:
ti 
Z
qt+1
[
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   w)dw]f t+1p;n (qt+1)dqt+1
We therefore have that for a parent with belief qti;e; the benet from a private school
vis a vis state school is:
ti = (
1
2
  wt+1) + (1  )(1
2
  
2
2
) + (1  )(1  )^ti: (8)
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Su¢ ciency: We know from the above that beliefs in the private school always remain
below q < 1
2
:We will now show that for all q < 1
2
; given that beliefs in the private school
are interior, then ti > 
t
1 , ^ti > ^t1: This implies that only the original dynasties
remain in the school. We therefore need to show that:Z
qt+1
[
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   w)dw]f t+1p;n (qt+1)dqt+1   (2qti;e  
2
2
) > 0 = ^t1:
A su¢ cient condition for this is that for any qt+1:Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
qti;edw  
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
wdw  
Z 
0
qti;edw +
Z 
0
wdw> 0, (9)Z 
(qt+1;qti;e)
(w   qti;e)dw> 0,
where the last inequality holds whenever qti;e <
1
2
and (qt+1;qti;e) < 1: This concludes
the su¢ ciency part as the measure  of private school dynasties dynasties will have a
strictly high willingness to pay for the private school compared with state school dynasties.
Finally note that the beliefs in the private school would converge to the singleton 0 as
they are always below a half.
Necessity: We can repeat the same proof as in Proposition 2 to show that whenever
long term segregation arises and the condition is violated, then we can look at the strictly
positive measure of dynasties at (q; q] whose beliefs are increasing and show that as a
measure 
2
of other dynasties have beliefs below "; then their loss from peer inuence in
the private school is large. To do so, we again focus on such dynasties in (q; q] whose
beliefs increase su¢ ciently slow so that others can converge to have beliefs below ": Note
now that,
^ti   ^t1
=
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   )dw) 
Z 
(qt+1;qti;e)
(   w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1) + 2(1  qti;e)
< 
Z
qt+1
(
Z 
(qt+1;qti;e)
(   w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1) + 2(1  qti;e)
Now choose " and T" such that a measure 2 of dynasties have beliefs below ": Note
that if i interacts with n of these dynasties, the measure of all such interactions is (
2
)n:
Choose a sequence of a strictly positive measure of dynasties whose beliefs converge to
one slow enough so that at T" their distance from one is  > 0 such that (qt+1; qti;e) is at
most 2": Then we will have:
^ti   ^t1 <  (

2
)n(
Z 
2"
(   w)dw) + 2 < 0
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whenever " and  are low enough (note that  does not depend on "): Thus in the next
period a strictly positive measure of state school parents will send their kids to the private
school. We can then follow the remainder of the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: We will show that ^ti for qi = q
( ; n); that is, the type at the
cuto¤, is monotonically decreasing in q( ; n): With some abuse of notation, denote this
by ^tq : Thus for more exclusive private schools in terms of their beliefs, ^
t
q   ^t1 = ^tq
will be higher.
^tq
=tq   (qtq;e  
1
2
)
=
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qt
q;e)
0
(qtq;e   w)dw)dF t+1p;n (qt+1)  (qtq;e  
1
2
):
Taking a derivative w.r.t q; we get
@qtq;e
@q
(
Z
qt+1
(
@(qt+1; qtq;e)
@qtq;e
(qtq;e   (qt+1; qtq;e)) + (qt+1; qtq;e))dF t+1p;n (qt+1)  1)
Note that
@(qt+1;qt
q;e)
@qt
q;e
(qtq;e (qt+1; qtq;e))+(qt+1; qtq;e) < 1 and thus the above is nega-
tive as required. To see why, note that the above is
@(qt+1;qt
q;e)
@qt
q;e
qtq;e+(1 
@(qt+1;qt
q;e)
@qt
q;e
)(qt+1; qtq;e):
As
@(qt+1;qt
q;e)
@qt
q;e
< 1; we have a convex combination of two beliefs that are both lower than
a half. To see why
@(qt+1;qt
q;e)
@qt
q;e
< 1; let x be the geometric average of the vector of be-
liefs qt+1; so that x = (
nQ
i=1
qi)
1
n : Thus we can write (qt+1; qtq;e) =
xnqt
q;e
xnqt
q;e+(1 qtq;e)(1 x)n
:
The derivative of this w.r.t. qtq;e is
xn(1 x)n
(qtq;exn qtq;e(1 x)n+(1 x)n)
2 : We need to show that
x
n
2 (1  x)n2 < qtq;exn qtq;e (1  x)n+(1  x)n ; or that 1 < qtq;e x1 xn=2+ 1 xx
n=2
(1 qtq;e):
Note however that 0:5 x
1 x +
1 x
x
(0:5) > 1; and as qtq;e; x < 0:5; for all higher n; we have
the required result.
Finally note that the highest willingness to pay is ^tqjq!0 ! 12 .
6.2 Appendix B: Endogenous wages
In this section of the Appendix we o¤er an alternative formulation of the labour market
in which wages are determined by Nash bargaining. Suppose that in any period, for any
employer, a position is made vacant. The new position requires a cost to train any new
hire. The cost c is drawn unifromly from [0; 1]. If hired for the position, an employee with
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productivity  2 f0; 1g will yield a net rent for the employer of    c. If the employee is
not hired, both the employer and the employee get zero in that period.
Given a belief qti;g of the employer, if the employee is hired, the total rents in the eyes of
the employer are qti;g c. For simplicity of exposition we assume that the employee and the
employer equally share these perceived rents generated by the match. Any (xed) interior
allocation is ne for our analysis.41 Thus, a private school graduate will be employed
by all, whereas a state school graduate employee will be employed by an employer from
dynasty i at period t if and only if c  qti;g:
With this formulation we can now prove Proposition 2:
Su¢ ciency: We know from the above that beliefs in the private school always remain
below q < 1
2
:We will now show that for all q < 1
2
; given that beliefs in the private school
are interior, then ^ti > ^
t
1: This implies that only the original dynasties remain in the
school. We therefore need to show that:
^ti
=ti   (qti;e  
3
4
)
=
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   c 
(qt+1; qti;e)  c
2
)dc)dF t+1p;n (q
t+1)  (qti;e  
3
4
) > 0 = ^t1:
A su¢ cient condition for this is that for any qt+1:Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   c 
(qt+1; qti;e)  c
2
)dc)dF t+1p;n (q
t+1)  (qti;e  
3
4
) > 0;
and this holds as qti;e <
1
2
. Finally note that the beliefs in the private school would converge
to the singleton 0 as they are always below a half. This concludes the su¢ ciency part as
the measure  of private school dynasties dynasties will have a strictly high willingness
to pay for the private school compared with state school dynasties.
Necessity: We can repeat exactly the same proof as in Proposition 2, to show that
eventually we would have a dynasty in the private school for whom ti < 
t
s: Specically,
to show this, the condition would become:
41When the employer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er he will o¤er a wage of zero to the employee
leaving the whole surplus qti;g   c to himself. When the employee makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er he will
o¤er a wage of qti;g   c leaving the employer with zero rents. When the bargaining power of the two sides
is more even, they will share the surplus qti;g   c more evenly.
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^ti   ^t1
=(1  qti;e) +
Z
qt+1
(
Z (qt+1;qti;e)
0
(qti;e   1 +
1  (qt+1; qti;e)
2
)dc)
 
Z
qt+1
Z 1
(qt+1;qti;e)
(1  c  1  c
2
)dc]f t+1p;n (q
t+1)dqt+1
<(qt+1; qti;e)(
1  (qt+1; qti;e)
2
) 
Z
qt+1
Z 1
(qt+1;qti;e)
(
1  c
2
)dc] f t+1p;n (q
t+1) dqt+1 + (1  qti;e)
Now choose " and T" such that a measure 2 of dynasties have beliefs below ": Note
that if i interacts with n of these dynasties, the measure of all such interactions is (
2
)n:
Choose a sequence of a strictly positive measure of dynasties whose beliefs converge to
one slow enough so that at T" their distance from one is  > 0 such that (qt+1; qti;e) is at
most 2": Then we will have:
^ti   ^t1 < 2"  (

2
)n
Z 1
2"
(
1  c
2
)dc+  < 0
whenever " and  are low enough (note that  does not depend on "): Thus in the next
period a strictly positive measure of state school parents will send their kids to the private
school. This would imply a breakup of segregation.
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